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Abstract
We reconsider the result that e¢ cient taxation involves a lower marginal tax on secondary
earners than on primary earners. Introducing labor force participation responses into the
analysis, we show that a second-earner tax allowance is better than selective marginal tax
rates.
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Whether the taxation of married couples should be based on the individual or the family is a
classic debating point in public ￿nance. Since the work of Boskin and Sheshinski (1983), an
e¢ ciency argument for individual-based taxation has been widely accepted. The argument is
based on the empirical observation that the labor supply of secondary earners (typically wives)
is more elastic than the labor supply of primary earners (typically husbands). In this case, a
traditional Ramsey-type argument calls for a lower marginal tax rate on the secondary earner to
minimize distortions of labor supply. This e¢ ciency principle is met by a progressive individual-
based income tax, because the secondary earner has a lower income than the primary earner.
By contrast, under a fully joint income tax based on family income, the marginal tax rates on
the two spouses are identical so that the Boskin-Sheshinski e¢ ciency principle is violated.
The literature has focused exclusively on labor supply responses along the intensive margin,
i.e., hours of work for those who are working. Labor supply responses along the extensive
margin ￿the margin of entry and exit ￿are not included in the analysis. This is at odds with
the modern empirical labor market literature which emphasizes the importance of accounting
for extensive responses. An emerging consensus is that most of the observed variation in labor
supply re￿ ects changes in labor force participation. While estimates of hours-of-work elasticities
tend to be close to zero for both males and females, the participation elasticity seems to be very
high for married women (Heckman, 1993; Blundell and MaCurdy, 1999).
These empirical insights call for a reconsideration of the e¢ cient tax treatment of married
couples. The reason is that the distortion of labor force participation is related to a di⁄erent tax
rate than the one distorting hours of work. While working hours depend on the marginal tax
rate, entry-exit decisions are in￿ uenced by the total tax burden on labor income and therefore
1the average tax rate. Intuitively, since the observed elasticity di⁄erential between spouses is
mainly due to participation e⁄ects, the Ramsey argument calls for a lower average tax rate
on secondary earners. By contrast, there is no reason to di⁄erentiate marginal tax rates to
increase labor supply and e¢ ciency. In practise, the e¢ cient tax system could be implemented
by a joint income tax featuring tax allowances for two-earner couples. Interestingly, the United
States had a system like that in the beginning of the 1980￿ s.
The following sections establish our result formally and provide a numerical example showing
the quantitative importance of our result. Of course, since we focus exclusively on economic
e¢ ciency, it would be premature to make ￿rm policy conclusions based on our analysis. Yet,
since the e¢ ciency principle for individual taxation has received considerable attention over the
years, it is worthwhile investigating its sensitivity to the assumption on which it is based. For
an analysis of family taxation with distributional concerns, we refer to Apps and Rees (1999)
and Kleven, Kreiner and Saez (2004).
2 The Analysis
2.1 Family Labor Supply Behavior
In this section, we set up a model accounting for both intensive and extensive labor supply
responses. In the modelling of extensive responses, we allow for discrete entry into the labor
market, consistent with empirical evidence showing that workers rarely choose very low hours of
work. This type of behavior is typically explained by non-convexities in preferences or budget
sets created by work costs (e.g. Cogan, 1981). These work costs may be monetary costs (say,
child care), time losses (e.g. commuting time) or emotional costs associated with working.
Below we adopt a stylized framework incorporating ￿xed work costs which may capture some
of these factors.
2Like Boskin and Sheshinski (1983), we consider the family to be the decision making unit
and assume that behavior is determined by the maximization of a household utility function.
Each family consists of two individuals, a primary earner (p) and a secondary earner (s), who
di⁄er in their preferences for work and in their market productivities. Both earners face ￿xed
work costs which are denoted by qp and qs, respectively. To obtain smooth changes in labor
force participation, we allow work costs to vary across families. The distribution of work costs
is captured by a joint density function f (qp;qs). The welfare of each family is represented by a
quasi-linear utility function,1
u(c;hp;hs) = c ￿ dp (hp) ￿ ds (hs); (1)
where c is family consumption, hp and hs are working hours, while dp and ds denote disutility
of work for the two spouses. Each disutility term is given by
di (hi) =
￿
qi + vi (hi) for hi > 0
0 for hi = 0
for i = p;s; (2)
where v0
i > 0 and v00
i > 0. This expression decomposes the cost of labor market participation
into the ￿xed cost, qi, as well as a variable cost depending on the number of working hours. The
disutility of non-participation is normalized to zero. The budget constraint for the household
equals
c ￿ wphp ￿ Tp (wphp) + wshs ￿ Ts (wshs); (3)
where wp and ws are wage rates, while Tp (￿) and Ts (￿) are separate and spouse-speci￿c tax
functions. The assumption of separate tax functions is conventional in the literature, and it
1The quasi-linear speci￿cation excludes income e⁄ects as often done in problems of optimal income taxation
(e.g. Diamond, 1998; Saez, 2002). In our context, with family taxation and endogenous labor market entry, the
problem becomes quite complicated to solve with a general preference speci￿cation.
3greatly simpli￿es the analysis.2 Moreover, we focus on tax schedules of the following form
Ti (wihi) =
￿
tiwihi + ri for hi > 0
0 for hi = 0
for i = p;s; (4)
where ti is the marginal tax rate on earnings, and ri is a tax which is conditional on positive
earnings but unrelated to the size of earnings. In other words, ri is a tax on labor market
entry or, if negative, an employment credit. Boskin and Sheshinski (1983) did not include this
instrument, but it is important in our context due to endogenous labor force participation.
The household maximizes utility subject to the budget constraint. Given participation, i.e.
hi > 0, the optimal labor supply is characterized by the standard marginal condition
(1 ￿ ti)wi = v0
i (h￿
i) for i = p;s: (5)
This expression shows that, if an individual chooses to work, the number of hours worked is
independent of the ￿xed work costs. But for the individual to enter the labor market in the
￿rst place, the utility from participation must be greater than or equal to the utility from
non-participation. This gives the following participation constraint
qi ￿ wih￿
i ￿ tiwih￿
i ￿ ri ￿ vi (h￿
i) ￿ q￿
i for i = p;s: (6)
Individuals with a ￿xed cost below the threshold-value q￿
i decide to work h￿
i hours while those
with a ￿xed cost above the threshold choose to stay outside the labor force. Notice that the
participation constraint depends on the total tax burden and therefore the average tax rate,
whereas hours of work conditional on working (eq. 5) is related to the marginal tax rate.







0 f (qs;qp)dqpdqs, and similarly for primary earners. The aggregate labor
2For an analysis of a fully general non-separable and non-linear income tax for couples, we refer to Kleven et
al. (2004).
4supply of primary and secondary earners, respectively, becomes
Li = h￿
iFi (q￿
i ) for i = p;s; (7)
where we have normalized the population of families to one. Hence, aggregate labor supply is
a product of hours of work for those who are working and the labor force participation rate.
The responsiveness along the two margins of labor supply may be captured by an hours-of-work
elasticity and a participation elasticity. The hours-of-work elasticity "i is de￿ned with respect
to the marginal net-of-tax wage, (1 ￿ ti)wi, and the participation elasticity ￿i is de￿ned with
respect to the net-of-tax income gain from entry, wih￿
i ￿ tiwih￿

















for i = p;s; (8)
where we have used the ￿rst-order conditions (5) and (6).
2.2 Optimal Tax Rules
To study the properties of an e¢ cient tax treatment of married couples, we derive aggregate
























s ￿ rs ￿ qs ￿ vs (h￿
s)]f (qp;qs)dqpdqs: (9)











s + rs) ￿ R; (10)
where R is an exogenous revenue requirement. To derive the e¢ cient tax system, we maximize
aggregate utilitarian welfare (9) with respect to the tax parameters tp, ts, rp, and rs subject to
the government budget constraint (10) and the labor supply decision rules (5)-(6). However,
5before proceeding to this problem, let us brie￿ y look at the more restrictive problem of propor-
tional separate tax schedules (rp = rs = 0), also considered by Boskin and Sheshinski (1983).







This policy rule is reminiscent of the Boskin-Sheshinski result that we should di⁄erentiate the
taxation of spouses according to their labor supply elasticities. There is a subtle di⁄erence,
however, in that our version of the optimality condition discerns hours-of-work responses from
participation responses. The formula thus emphasizes that taxation should be di⁄erentiated
according to total elasticities including both margins of labor supply response:
Proposition 1 With proportional and separate tax schedules, the spouse with the lower total
labor supply elasticity, "i + ￿i, should face the higher tax rate.
The analysis underlying Proposition 1 stipulates that marginal and average tax rates are
identical for each spouse. This is an important limitation in our context, because marginal
and average taxes operate through di⁄erent margins of labor supply response. To separate
the average from the marginal tax rate, we incorporate the instrument ri into the optimal tax
analysis. However, with no further restrictions, the solution would become trivial. It is easy to
see that ri is a more e¢ cient instrument than ti, such that the optimal policy would involve zero
marginal tax rates.3 This result is not interesting, since it derives solely from the fact that we







s) = 0: (12)
3This is because ri distorts only the participation decision, whereas the marginal tax rate ti distorts partici-
pation and hours of work at the same time.
6This constraint implies that the ri￿ s cannot a⁄ect the aggregate tax revenue collected; they
a⁄ect only the distribution of tax payments on primary and secondary earners. For example, a
policy with rs < 0 (and hence rp > 0) corresponds to a second-earner tax allowance ￿nanced by
a tax on the primary earner. In this way, the policy maker can shift average tax burdens across
spouses without changing their marginal tax rates, which is clearly a realistic policy option.
The extra degree of freedom would not be important if one were to consider only intensive
margin responses, but becomes important once participation e⁄ects are accounted for.
The solution to the revised optimization problem is found by maximizing (9) with respect
to tp, ts, rp, and rs subject to eqs (5), (6), (10), and (12). Letting ai ￿ Ti (￿)=(wih￿
i) denote






















where ￿ ￿ ti
1￿ti"i < 1. From these two formulae, we obtain
Proposition 2 (i) For the spouse with the higher (lower) hours-of-work elasticity, the marginal
tax rate should be lower (higher). (ii) For the spouse with the higher (lower) participation
elasticity relative to hours-of-work elasticity, the average tax rate should be lower (higher) than
the marginal tax rate.
Comparing Propositions 1 and 2, we see that the results change remarkably once a more
general tax system is allowed for. First of all, information about total labor supply elasticities
is no longer su¢ cient for policy design; we need to distinguish the two margins of labor supply
response. Relative marginal tax rates are determined by hours-of-work elasticities alone. Al-
7though the marginal tax rates tp and ts do a⁄ect the extensive margin, the marginal deadweight
losses on this margin may be equalized across spouses through a suitable shift in tax allowances
(rp and rs). Hence, the policy maker should focus entirely on the intensive margin when setting
marginal tax rates.
The di⁄erentiation of average tax rates, on the other hand, is determined by the ratio of
participation elasticities (￿s=￿p) over the ratio of hours-of-work elasticities ("s="p). Only in the
implausible case where relative participation elasticities equal relative hours-of-work elasticities
is it optimal to di⁄erentiate average and marginal tax rates to the same degree. As mentioned
in the Introduction, estimated participation elasticities are much higher for secondary earners
than for primary earners, while hours-of-work elasticities tend to be very low for both husbands
and wives. Proposition 2 then shows that marginal tax rates should be identical, whereas the
average/total tax burden should be di⁄erentiated in favor of the secondary earner.
2.3 A Numerical Example
To get a sense of the quantitative importance of our results, it is useful to consider a numerical
example. In line with the empirical literature, we assume that the hours-of-work elasticity is
0.1 for both spouses, and that the participation elasticity for the secondary earner is ￿ve times
higher than for the primary earner. Moreover, we assume that the government must collect a
tax revenue equal to 40 per cent of aggregate earnings, that secondary earnings (conditional on
entry) equal 2/3 of primary earnings, and that the secondary earners￿participation rate is 2/3
of the primary earners￿ s rate. In this example, it is straightforward to see that the e¢ cient tax
system features a 40% marginal tax rate for both spouses. Moreover, by solving numerically
eqs (12) and (14), we ￿nd that the optimal average tax rate of the secondary earner is around
15%, while the average tax rate of the primary earner is circa 50%. To conclude, the e¢ ciency
8principle derived in this paper may call for a large di⁄erentiation of average tax rates across
spouses, implemented by a second-earner tax allowance. Marginal tax rates, on the other hand,
need not be di⁄erentiated for e¢ ciency purposes.
A Derivation of eq. (11)
The government￿ s problem is to maximize (9) subject to (10) under the assumption that rp =







































where ￿ is a Lagrangian multiplier and where h￿
i and q￿
i are determined by eqs (5) and (6). The


















































From eqs (5) and (6), we obtain @h￿

















Since the two earners are symmetric in the model, the ￿rst-order condition for ts may be
obtained simply by changing the subscript from p to s in the above equation. Combining the
two ￿rst-order conditions to eliminate ￿, we obtain eq. (11).
9B Derivation of eqs (13) and (14)



















































where ￿1 and ￿2 are Lagrangian multipliers and where h￿
i and q￿
i are determined by eqs (5)
and (6). The ￿rst-order conditions for tp and rp are given by (there are of course symmetric













































































































From eqs (5) and (6), we obtain @h￿























































10This relationship may be combined with a symmetric relationship for the other spouse so at to
obtain eq. (13).























By inserting the de￿nition of the average tax rate, ap, and noting that ap￿tp =
rp
wphp, the above











Finally, eq. (14) is obtained by dividing the above expression with (13).
In order to see that ￿ < 1, notice that eq. (16) and the symmetric equation for the other
spouse imply
























Since the Lagrangian multiplier ￿1 re￿ ects the utility loss of collecting additional revenue, this
parameter is positive. This implies that the ￿rst term on each right-hand side is negative. The
second terms on the right-hand sides have opposite signs because rp and rs have opposite signs.








where the last inequality follows from ￿1 > 0.
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